Recent research has focused on the difference between description and experience based decisions and on their treatment of rare events. While rare events are overweighted in description based decisions, people tend to behave as if they underweight rare events in decisions based on experience. Barron and Erev (2003) and Hertwig et al. (2004) argue that such findings are substantive and call for a theory of decision making under risk other than Prospect Theory when decision are based upon experience. Fox and Hadar (2006) suggest that the discrepancy is due to sampling error: people are likely to sample rare events less often than objective probability implies, especially if their samples are small. Ungemach, Chater, Stewart (2008) and Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer and Hertwig (2008) show that forcing subjects to sample more reduces the description-experience gap but doesn't eliminate it. The current paper brings stronger evidence in favor of the description-experience gap with two new experiments. The first shows that the gap persists even when people know the actual distribution of outcomes and make a decision under risk rather than under uncertainty. The second shows that the gap exists also when people make repeated decisions controlling for sample biases and the "hot stove" effect.
Introduction
Several recent papers have focused on the experience-description gap, the observation that while people tend to overweight small probabilities in decisions from description, they appear to underweight small probabilities in decisions from experience. Fox and Hadar (2006, hereafter FH) note that, in Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004, hereafter HBWE) , behavior that appears to reflect underweighting can be explained by sampling error; it follows from the binomial distribution that people are more likely to under-sample rare events then to over-sample them. FH demonstrate that the two-stage choice model (Fox & Tversky, 1998) that assumes that choice can be predicted from estimated probabilities can account for subjects choices in HBWE where subjects were making choices based on small samples. This paper's main goal is to examine the usefulness of FH's account in explaining decisions from experience beyond the HBWE paradigm.
As FH point out, while description based decisions are decisions under risk (as the lotteries are known) experience based decisions are decisions under uncertainty since the lotteries are typically unlabelled buttons. Underweighting of rare events has been observed in two different paradigms under uncertainty. In the first, repeated decision making, people repeatedly chose between two unmarked buttons, each representing a static lottery. After each choice one outcome is drawn from the chosen lottery and is added or subtracted from the subject earnings. In the second, free sampling paradigm, two unmarked buttons again represent static lotteries. However, subjects only make a single choice between the two options. Before they chose, subjects are allowed to sample outcomes from the two buttons as often as they wish without incurring actual gains or losses. Once satisfied with their search, subjects make a single choice and one outcome is drawn from that button's associated distribution. These two paradigms, while different from each other, have in common the incremental acquisition of information over time about the underlying lotteries. Additionally, both paradigms demonstrate decision making under knightian uncertainty. They do not constitute decisions under risk since, no matter how many outcomes are sampled, there will be heterogeneous beliefs about the underlying distributions that remain unknown (Fox & Hadar, 2006) 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature on the description-experience gap in two main ways: as the underweighting of rare events has been observed in both the repeated choice paradigm (ex. Barron & Erev, 2003 , Erev & Barron 2005 ) and the free sampling paradigm (ex. Hertwig et. al., 2004) we examine the role of sampling error in both contexts. First, in Experiment 1 we introduce a version of the sampling paradigm that specifically examines decisions under risk, where the underlying choice distributions are known. This paradigm allows us to examine not only the predictions of the two-stage model (as has been done in other recent papers), but also those of Prospect Theory as the decisions are made under risk. Secondly, in Experiment 2 we examine a repeated choice task designed to be free of sampling error. The results of both experiments demonstrate the underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience, i.e. the descriptionexperience gap, even in the absence of any sample error.
Experiment 1: decisions under risk after "representative" sampling
The role of sampling error in the underweighting of rare events in the sampling paradigm has been explored in recent papers on decisions from experience (Ungemach, Chater, Stewart, 2008, hereafter UCS; Hau, Pleskac, Kiefer, Hertwig, 2008, hereafter HPKH) . These works have shown that while sample error may be sufficient for the observed gap between decisions from description and decisions from experience to occur, it is by no means necessary. These results pose a challenge to FH's account of underweighting, but are consistent with Hertwig et. al.'s explanation; that underweighting is due to over reliance on small samples drawn from memory (Kareev 2000) . However, as noticed by FH with regard to HBWE, all of these papers present decisions under uncertainty, i.e. probabilities and outcomes of the lotteries were not known nor was it possible to learn them with certainty. In UCS -which follows HBWEsubjects were prompted to sample forty times from two unmarked buttons and the only information they had was that the buttons represented two stable payoff distributions.
HPKH used the same sampling paradigm but, instead of two unmarked buttons, they used the metaphor of a deck of cards specifying that the sampled cards were reshuffled into the deck. Hence, beginning with HBWE, the literature has focused on decisions under uncertainty with the sampling pardigm.
In Experiment 1 we first ask the question: what is the minimal change to the typical description paradigm (choice between described gambles) that leads to experience based decisions and the underweighting of small probabilities? In other words, is it necessary to give up risk? Or is it necessary to impose uncertainty in order to observe the underweighting of small probabilities?
Several important examples in the history of decision making research appear to involve violations of expected utility theory in decisions under risk with some form of experience. In Samuelson paradox 1 , for instance, what is striking from an expected/prospect utility theory point of view is precisely the change in the willingness to accept a gamble involving a risky lottery: the odds and stakes are known but the average decision maker accepts the gamble depending on how many times the lottery is played.
Similarly, in Experiment 1 we designed a sampling paradigm which allows subjects to compute the actual probabilities of the lotteries and to know with certainty all the outcomes so that they actually make a decision under risk. Subjects were presented with two unmarked buttons and told that they corresponded to two boxes containing 100 balls each, with one of two numbers attached to each ball. They were then instructed to sample from each box (in any order they desired) all the balls and observe their values, one by one until both boxes were empty. The boxes would then be refilled with the same balls and they would choose a box from which to draw a single ball for real money. They were provided with paper and pencil and a few subjects were actually keeping a tally throughout the experiment.
Method
A hundred and twenty two students of the Boston area took part in the experiment.
The experiment involved monetary incentives. The average pay was $27.20.
During each session subjects went through two similar experiments (Experiment 1A and 1B), each composed of two phases: the difference between the two experiments is that we used two different sets of lotteries, but they are otherwise identical. The order was randomized.
Phase 1 of each experiment is a BDM-like procedure (Becker, Degroot and Marschak, 1964) meant to elicit two lotteries that the subject was indifferent between.
This task was the same for the description and the experience conditions. Subjects Where R stands for Risky and S for Safe and each lottery has a zero outcome. The probabilities were chosen in keeping with the values for which over and underweighting is typically observed in decisions from description and experience. The X's were chosen in order to identify the value, X_indiff, for which each subject was indifferent between the lotteries. That is, X started out randomly at either 0 or 40 and then increased if R was preferred and decreased otherwise. After the thirteenth choice we were able to identify the implied indifference point for each subject. We employed the BDM procedure in Phase 1 in order to at least partially control for heterogeneity in preferences for risk.
Thus, difference in choices can only be traced to the difference in conditions and cannot possibly be influenced by pre-existing preferences over particular lotteries.
In Phase 2 of each experiment subjects were randomly allocated between a Description and an Experience condition, between subjects, and made an actual decision between ($X_indiff -$0.02, 0.9) and R:($40, 0.1) (or ($X_indiff -$0.02, 0.8) and R:($40, 0.2) for the Experiment 1B). The two cents subtraction from the indifference point elicited in Phase 1, X_indiff, is meant to create, if any, a slight preference for the risky option, a sort of common baseline which enabled us to have a prior on the outcomes. We also wanted to avoid subjects feeling committed to their previously indicated indifference which might have occurred if we had presented the subjects with the same lotteries form the end Phase 1.
Subjects in the Description condition made a single choice between the two prospects Just as described in the previous paragraph. In the Experience condition subjects were told the box story mentioned above: they didn't observe the prospects, but rather experienced the two corresponding distributions by exhaustively sampling two sets of 100 outcomes, without return, that were randomly constructed to reflect the same two lotteries. In other words, if a lottery was ($1, 0.2), the corresponding set of outcomes would have included 20 $1 outcomes and 80 $0 outcomes. After sampling all the outcomes subjects made a single choice based on their experience of the two distributions. After Phase 2 was completed subjects were paid according to the following rule: one pair of lotteries was picked at random out of the 13 pairs in Phase 1 of each experiment as well as the pairs in phases 2; this gave us four pairs of lotteries which we played and showed to the subject; out of these we randomly selected one and paid the subject according to his choice in that pair. This simple rule allowed us to make the BDM procedure incentive compatible while keeping the experiment financially affordable.
Finally, while the Description condition is the standard paradigm, the Experience condition addresses the FH critique forcing subjects to actually sample the entire distribution of each lottery. As already mentioned, they were told that underlying each button were 100 balls of two types in fixed proportions, each with a different dollar value attached. While these proportions were clearly stated in the Description condition they had to be experienced through sampling in the Experience condition. Subjects had no time pressure and were allowed to take notes. Sampling the two hundred balls took no more then ten minutes. Thus, subjects in both conditions made choices under risk because there was full information about both distributions.
Results
The proportion of Risky choices was 56% and 38% in the Description and Experience conditions respectively (z=7.37, chi-square test for proportions, p<0.01). This result is consistent with overweighting of rare events in decisions from description and underweighting them in decisions from experience. Table 1 shows the mean choice of the risky prospect R for Description and Experience conditions disaggregated by experiments 1A and 1B with a 10% chance and a 20% chance rare event. In parenthesis we report the prediction of Prospect Theory, with the parameters estimated in Tversky and Kahneman (1992) . The prediction is calculated per each subject using the X_indiff taken from the BDM procedure of phase 1 and then the mean is taken over all subjects. Notice that the experienced probabilities in the Experience condition, because of our design, are the same as the "objective" or real probabilities. Prospect Theory consistently predicts a preference for R, primarily due to the larger weight given by PT's weighting function to the rare event. However, as is apparent from the table, behavior switches from a moderate preference for R when decisions are taken from description to a clear preference for S when they are taken from experience. Table 2 reports the percentage of choices correctly predicted by Prospect Theory in all the conditions. It is evident that Prospect Theory does a better job at predicting behavior when decisions are taken from description than when they are taken from experience. Simple learning models of repeated choice predict that underweighting of rare events will occur due to an over reliance on small samples (Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005) and/or due to the "hot stove" effect (Denrell & March, 2001 ) where a bad outcome decreases choice from the same distribution again in the future. In both cases, while the models predict that sample error can increase the apparent underweighting of rare events, they also predict that underweighting will persist even in the absence of sampling error. These predictions stand in contrast to the account of underweighting given by FH in which underweighting should disappear when sample error is controlled for. The remainder of this paper examines this hypothesis in both a reanalysis of the Barron & Erev (2003) repeated choice data and a laboratory experiment.
Revisiting the Barron & Erev (2003) data
If sample error is the prime mechanism driving the gap between experience and description based decisions, as FH suggest, the gap should disappear when we examine subjects who observed the rare event approximately the expected number of times. To evaluate this assertion we identified the 6 problems studied by Barron and Erev (2003) for which the analysis is relatively straight forward. The 6 lottery pairs, and their problem number from the Barron & Erev (2003) paper, appear in Table 3 . Each pair includes one risky two-outcome lottery and one safe certain-outcome lottery. The lottery with the higher expected value (H) appears in second column and the lottery with the lower expected value (L) appears in the third column. The fourth column shows the proportion of H choices aggregated over subjects and over 400 trials. As noted in Barron & Erev (2003) , behavior in each of the problems is consistent with underweighting of the rare event and is inconsistent with Prospect Theory (assuming the parameters estimated in Tversky and Kahneman,1992) .
To examine the behavior of those subjects whose outcomes were relatively unbiased we first computed, for each individual, the observed frequency of the rare event in the risky lottery. We then removed all subjects whose observed frequency of the rare event was greater or less then one standard deviation away from the expected frequency. The remaining number of subjects appears in the right most column of Table 3 . As shown in the table, in 4 of the 6 problems, the proportion of H choices did not change significantly when we restricted the analysis to subjects whose outcomes were more representative of the original distributions. In two of the 6 problems, 8 and 9 the less biased subjects chose H significantly more often. However, even in these two problems the choice of the modal subject was the same as that in the unrestricted data set (i.e. they continued to choose L most of the time).
In summary, the reanalysis of the repeated choice paradigm in Barron and Erev (2003) does not support FH's argument that what appears to be underweighting of rare events is in fact the result of sample error. Even when observed outcomes approximate expected distributions, behavior remains consistent with the underweighting of small probabilities.
Three shortcomings of the above analysis need to be addressed. First, the analysis performed was not particularly sensitive. Observed frequencies of the rare event still fluctuated in the +1/-1STD range for individual subjects, each of whom was incurring a different stream of payoffs from choosing safe and risky options. Secondly, the stream of observed payoffs was path dependent since subjects only observed the outcome from the chosen option (i.e. forgone payoffs were not observed). Underweighting in this case can be the result of the "hot stove effect" which effectually leads to a biased sample as people cease to choose an option after an unlucky streak of bad outcomes. Thirdly, subjects were not asked to estimate the probability of the rare event. Thus, we still don't know if any judgment error has occurred and can not directly test the predictions of the two-stage choice model that uses estimations to predict choice. We address all these limitations in an experiment using the repeated choice paradigm where all subjects observe the same stream of incurred and forgone payoffs. We elicit estimations of the rare event and the complete stream of payoffs is representative of the underlying payoff distributions.
Experiment 2: repeated choice and judgment

Method:
Twenty-four Technion students served as paid participants in the study and performed both a binary choice task and a probability assessment task. The binary choice task was performed under uncertainty one hundred times (with immediate feedback on both obtained and forgone payoffs) with the probability assessment task following each choice in rounds 51-100. Upon completion, participants performed a one-time retrospective probability assessment task.
In the binary choice task, participants chose between two unmarked buttons presented on the screen. Each button was associated with one of two distributions
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referred to here as S (for safe) and R (for risky). The S distribution provided a certain loss of 3 points while the R distribution provided a loss of 20 points with probability 0.15 and zero otherwise. Thus, the two distributions had equal expected value and the exchange rate was 100pts = 1 Shekels (about 18 US cents).
To assure that all subjects experienced the same representative sequence of outcomes we first produced random sequences of 100 outcomes and the first sequence with an observed probability of 0.15 for the -20 outcome was used for all participants.
The sequence provided the -20 outcome on rounds 12, 15, 19, 20, 21, 23, 25, 35, 40, 41, 60, 73, 80, 87, and 96. In the probability assessment task, performed after each binary choice in trials 51-100, participants were prompted to estimate the chances (in terms of a percentage between 0 and 100) of -20 appearing (on the R button) on the next round.
After completing 100 rounds participants were asked to estimate ("end-of-game estimates"), to the best of their recollection, two conditional probabilities: (1) 
Results:
The mean probability assessment from trials 51-100, aggregated over trials and over subjects, was 0.27. This value is significantly larger than 0.163, the mean running average of the observed probability of the -20 outcome (t[23] = 3.11, p <.01). Thus, the results reflect overestimation of the rare event.
As shown in Table 4 , participants' aggregate proportion of R choices was 0.74 All t-tests are one-sample tests unless otherwise noted.
In order to confirm that the different reactions occur at the level of individual subjects a pair-wise within-subjects analysis was performed. For 63% (15/24) of the participants, assessment and choice results were not consistent in terms of the implied weighting of the -20 outcome. Overestimation and underweighting of rare events was found to occur in 100% of these 15 cases.
Discussion
Both the analysis of the Barron & Erev (2003) repeated choice data and the new experiment presented here demonstrate the underweighting of rare events even when sample error is controlled for or eliminated. Additionally, when probability estimates were elicited in order to allow for possible judgment error, they reflected overweighting of the rare event. This pattern is inconsistent with the account of underweighting offered by Fox and Hadar (2006) . Experience based decisions remain qualitatively different from description based decisions in ways beyond subjects' tendency to under sample lotteries, as was the case in Hertwig et. al.'s (2004) sampling paradigm. All the data presented in the current paper are consistent with the assumption that peoples choices tend to rely on
